Social Networks and Labor Market Transitions by Bramoullé, Yann & Saint-Paul, Gilles
Social Networks and Labor Market Transitions
Yann Bramoullé and Gilles Saint-Paul
July 2004
Abstract : We study the influence of social networks on labor market transitions. We develop
the first model where social ties and job status coevolve through time. Our key assumption is
that the probability of formation of a new tie is greater between two employed individuals than
between an employed and an unemployed individual. We show that this assumption generates
negative duration dependence of exit rates from unemployment. Our model has a number of
novel testable implications. For instance, we show that a higher connectivity among unemployed
individuals reduces duration dependence and that exit rates depend positively on the duration of
the last job held by the unemployed worker.
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I. Introduction
The importance of social ties in finding a job is documented by a long tradition in sociology and
labor economics.1 However, very little work has tried to confront that literature with stylized
facts about the anatomy of unemployment. An important paper by Calvó-Armengol and Jackson
(2003) goes a long way into bridging that gap. They construct a model where it is shown that
if social ties are important, then one should observe negative duration dependence of exit rates
from unemployment.
The present paper builds on that contribution by proposing another mechanism through which
social ties may affect duration dependence, which we believe is more quantitatively significant.
The network of social ties in our approach is endogenous instead of fixed as in Calvó-Armengol
and Jackson. We assume that a bond between an employed and an unemployed worker, which
increases the unemployed’s likelihood of finding a job, is less likely to arise than between two
employed workers–an assumption we refer to as economic inbreeding.
We show that this simple and plausible assumption has a number of implications, one of which
is negative duration dependence of exit rates. This is because the long-term unemployed then have
fewer connections with employed workers than the short-term unemployed, which reduces their
exit rates compared to the latter. We find that the amount of duration dependence introduced by
that mechanism is far higher quantitatively than under a fixed network. Furthermore, duration
dependence under a fixed network is essentially due to heterogeneity in the number of connections
among workers, i.e. unemployment duration is positively correlated with having few connections.
In contrast, our source of duration dependence remains operative even controlling for an individual
fixed effect.
The effect we highlight is therefore that workers accumulate social capital (as defined by
the stock of ties with employed workers) during employment, that this stock is depleted during
unemployment, and that social capital increases the likelihood of finding a job.
We study a dynamic process where job status and social ties coevolve through time. This
process allows us to investigate in detail the properties of duration dependence. We notably
analyze how changes in the model’s parameters affect the magnitude of duration dependence. To
1See e.g. Rees (1966), Montgomery (1991), Topa (2001) in economics and Granovetter (1995), Petersen et al.
(2000) in sociology.
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illustrate our comparative statics results, consider the likelihood of formation of a new tie between
two unemployed workers. We find that an increase in the connectivity of the unemployed reduces
duration dependence. Why? When this connectivity is higher, a long-term unemployed will
have relatively more unemployed friends. These friends consitute a form of latent social capital.
They are not directly helpful but they become helpful when they find a job. Thus, prospects of
finding a job for the long-term unemployed are indirectly improved, which explains the reduction
in duration dependence. We develop similar analysis for the other parameters of the model.
Another important prediction of our model is that exit rates positively depend on the duration
of the last job held by the unemployed worker. This is again due to the greater connectivity
between two employed workers as compared to between an employed and an unemployed. People
who have been employed longer have more ties with employed workers than those who have been
employed for a shorter time. Hence, the former will find jobs more easily than the latter if they
become unemployed.
Finally, we look at the extent of social separation that emerges between employed and unem-
ployed. This separation turns out to be quite low when the labor market turnover is sufficiently
high. The labor market thus plays a mixing role, offseting the original bias in link formation.
That establishing a tie with an employed is easier when one is also employed, our key as-
sumption, is uncontroversial and well documented. The workplace is an important locus of social
interaction,2 and residential segregation by income and economic status also makes it more likely
that the employed match together rather than with the unemployed in out-of-workplace social
interactions such as bars, sports clubs, school committees, and so on.3 The mechanism we study
is also consistent with descriptive accounts of social exclusion and on how long spells of unem-
ployments progressively isolate people from the workplace.
That exit rates from unemployment tend to be be lower when the duration of the spell goes
up is also a well-documented fact. However, whether it is due to unobserved heterogeneity —
with workers with an intrinsically lower job finding probability being over-represented among the
long-term unemployed — or to a genuine fall in exit rates as unemployment duration goes up,
is a matter of controversy, which to our knowledge is not resolved. Depending on which study
2see e.g. Granovetter (1995, p. 152).
3The fact that social ties are formed preferentially among people who have similar attributes, a property often
referred to as “homophily”, is well established in the social network literature, see e.g. Lazarsfeld and Merton
(1954).
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is used, opposite conclusions are reached. A recent study by Abbring et al. (2002) controls
for unobserved heterogeneity and finds evidence of true negative duration dependence at long
durations. Rosholm (2000), reaches similar conclusions, as do Arulampalam et al. (2000). But
Steiner (2001), using German data, does not find duration dependence, while Van den Berg and
Van Ours (1996), using US data, find duration dependence for some groups but not all.
II. The model
Our model is a minimal model designed at capturing the idea that social ties are more likely to
arise between people of similar labor market status (“economic inbreeding”). In particular, we
abstract from phenomena like price determination in general equilibrium, or the resources needed
for establishing and maintaining social ties. While introducing these considerations would be of
great interest, our simplified framework allows to focus on the role of economic inbreeding, and
it is likely that our results would be robust to any extension of the model that preserves the
economic inbreeding property.
We consider a group of n agents with similar characteristics, looking for similar jobs. Time is
discrete. At each date t = 0, 1, ..., an individual i is either employed or unemployed. Labor market
state is described by a function si,t = 1 if i is employed at t and 0 if unemployed. Aggregate
unemployment ut at time t is thus ut = n−Pni=1 si,t. Next, we model the social network among
agents. At each date t, there are links between people described by the function gij,t = 1 if i and
j are connected and 0 if not. Links are symmetric: gij,t = gji,t. The resulting pattern of links at
t is a social network gt. At t = 0, the initial labor state s0 and the initial social network g0 are
drawn at random. Labor state and ties then coevolve through time in the following manner.
Job destruction: The transition rate from employed to unemployed is constant and equal to d.
Job creation: This process determines who finds a new job. At any date t, a flow of hut jobs
are created. The flow probability that an unemployed becomes employed is proportional to his
number of ties with employed workers. Formally, let nt(i) =
Pn
j=1 sj,tgij,t denote the number of
ties that individual i has with employed workers. Then,
proba(si,t+1 = 1|si,t = 0) = hut nt(i)P
j:sj,t=0 nt(j)
(II.1)
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Link destruction: Any given link is destroyed with probability λ.
Link creation: The probability of formation of a new connection between two individuals
depends on their job status:
a. If i and j are employed at t and gij,t = 0, there is a probability pEE that a link is formed
between them and gij,t+1 = 1.
b. If i and j are unemployed at t and gij,t = 0, there is a probability pUU that a link is formed
between them and gij,t+1 = 1.
c. If i is employed and j unemployed, the probability is pUE .
In our analysis, we focus on situations where people have greater chance to connect with people
of their own type: pEE ≥ pUE and pUU ≥ pUE.
This process is characterized by a number of features. First, it captures in a simple way
the property that connections with employed have a positive impact on the likelihood to find a
job. Equation (II.1) could be interpreted as follows: a total number h of jobs per unemployed
worker are created during period t. Those who hear about them first are the employed; if jobs
are created randomly, each employed has the same probability to hear about a position. The
employed then tell about the jobs in a random and uniform fashion to their unemployed friends.
The unemployed who hear about the jobs then apply to all the jobs that have been mentioned to
them by their friends. Employers then hire randomly from all the applicants to a given position.
If h is not too high, one can neglect cases where an unemployed gets more than one offer, and a
good approximation to an unemployed’s probability of finding a job is equation (II.1), which tells
us that the probability of being hired is proportional to the number of ties one has with employed
workers.
Second, we can study fixed social networks by simply setting λ = pEE = pUE = pUU = 0. This
allows us to compare, in the next section, the effect of fixed and endogenous networks. Third,
observe that network effects affect the distribution of jobs among individuals and across time, but
not the aggregate level of unemployement. This is because the average number of jobs created in
period t is hut, hence the average level of unemployment is d/(d+ h).
In the remainder of the paper, we report numerical simulations of our model, use them to
perform comparative statics exercises, and we provide economic interpretations of the results.
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III. Fixed vs. endogenous networks
A crucial aspect of our model is the reciprocal feedback between social connections and labor
market status. The results we report in this section highlight the important role played by that
feedback in generating duration dependence in unemployment exit rates. To measure duration
dependence we simply use the regression coefficient of the likelihood of being employed at date t+1
conditional on being unemployed at date t and on the duration of unemployment up to t. Table 1
compares that coefficient between a median simulation with an endogenous network and one with
an exogenous one. Simulations are conducted for n = 100 individuals and T = 20, 000 periods.4
We consider the following benchmark for the parameters of the model: h = 0.12, d = 0.02 and
λ = 0.01, pUU = pEE = 0.02, pUE = 10−5. This leads to an aggregate level of unemployment of
14.3%. In each period, individuals lose, on average, 1% of their connections and form 2% of the
possible connections with others of their own type. Two features characterize these benchmark
values. First, we set λ, pUU , pUE , pEE at relatively low levels. This gives us confidence that our
findings on the effect of link evolution are robust. Second, pUE is almost equal to zero. This allows
us to investigate more sharply the effect of our key assumption that ties form preferentially among
people of the same labor status. Both features will be relaxed in the analysis. Finally, for each
estimation, we consider three simulation runs and report the estimates from the median run.
Standard errors are given in parenthesis. The intercept can be interpreted as the probability to
find a new job for an individual who has just lost his previous job. The slope captures the effect
of the duration of unemployment.
Table 1: Fixed vs endogenous network - pooled data
Fixed network Endogenous network
Intercept 0.122724 (0.001247) 0.130023 (0.001167)
Slope (∗10−4) -2.35 (1.06) -10.62 (0.86)
Clearly, the regression coefficient is negative in both cases, but larger with an endogenous
network.
4The initial labor state and social network are picked at random. In the estimations, we restrict attention to
values from periods 10, 000 to 20, 000 to remove initial effects.
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Next, we control for individual fixed effects. Duration dependence with a fixed network then
disappears as shown in Table 1bis. This indicates that duration dependence observed on pooled
data for fixed networks is mainly caused by heterogeneity in the individual number of ties.
Table 1bis: Fixed vs endogenous network - individual fixed effects
Fixed network Endogenous network
Intercept 0 (0.000868) 0 (0.000858)
Slope (∗10−4) -0.43 (1.07) -9.81 (0.87)
In contrast, Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2003) show that duration dependence arises at the
individual level with a fixed network. In their model, a long spell of unemployement indicates
that the individual’s contacts are more likely to be unemployed. This, in turn, leads to a lower
probability of finding a job through contacts. This effect clearly applies in our context. How-
ever, our results show that its magnitude is likely to be very low. Here, duration dependence is
much stronger: unemployed workers gradually lose connections with employed ones as their spell
lengthens. These connections are not replaced one for one because pUE < pEE . Consequently,
the long-term unemployed have much fewer connections with the employed than the short-term
unemployed. This is shown on Figure 1 and Figure 1bis which depict, for a typical run and
benchmark values, the average probability to find a job and the average number of connections
that an unemployed has with the employed as function of time spent unemployed. As the proba-
bility of getting a job increases with the number of connections with the employed, the exit rate
from unemployment is smaller, the longer the unemployment spell. This mechanism is clearly
not present under a fixed network.
IV. Comparative statics: duration dependence
In this section, we study more thoroughly how network evolution produces duration dependence.
We perform a number of comparative statics exercise, measuring duration dependence both with
curves giving the average probability to find a job as a function of time spent unemployed and
with the regression coefficient of the probability of finding a job on spell length. We show that the
effect of a parameter’s change on duration dependence can be understood through its differential
effect on the average number of connections with employed workers of long-term unemployed and
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short-term unemployed. To make our case more clearly, we will define the latter as a worker
who just lost his job. His social capital is therefore chiefly determined by the ties he made while
employed.
A. Effect of pUE
The most straightforward determinant of duration dependence is pUE, the connectivity between
the employed and the unemployed. As Table 2 makes clear, an increase in pUE unambiguously
reduces duration dependence (see also Figure 2). The mechanism is simple: the gross inflow of ties
between an unemployed person and employed workers is greater when pUE goes up, so that the
stock of such ties goes down more slowly during the unemployment spell. Therefore, the difference
between the number of connections with an employed worker, of a long-term unemployed and a
short-term unemployed, is smaller, and so is the difference between their exit rates (Figure 2bis).
Table 2: Effect of connectivity between employed and unemployed
pUE = 10
−5 pUE = 0.005 pUE = 0.01
Intercept 0.130023 (0.001167) 0.124825 (0.001225) 0.122285 (0.001220)
Slope (∗10−4) -10.62 (0.86) -6.38 (1.00) -4.70 (1.01)
One may also view it as follows: pUE is the key determinant of the number of ties between a
long-term unemployed and an employed person. In contrast, it has a weaker and indirect effect on
the ties of a short-term unemployed, which only goes through the “echo” of the ties he was making
during his previous, if any, unemployment spell. Because of the attrition of these ties during his
last job, a short-term unemployed’s stock of ties with an employed worker is less sensitive to pUE
than for a long-term unemployed.
B. Effect of pEE
What about the effect of pEE , connectivity between the employed? Table 3 and Figure 3 show
that duration dependence is larger, the larger pEE. This is because pEE has a strong direct effect
on a short-term unemployed’s number of ties with the employed, while the effect on the long-term
unemployed’s ties is weaker and more indirect. The most recent ties of a short-term unemployed
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have been made during his last job, and chiefly depend on pEE . In contrast, pEE affects a long-
term unemployed’s stock of ties only through the echo effect of the ties made during his last
job. Again, attrition of that stock during the unemployment spell reduces the effect of pEE on
the long-term unemployed’s stock of ties. Consequently, pEE increases the stock of ties with the
employed more for the short-term than for the long-term unemployed (Figure 3bis), and the same
is true for exit rates.
Table 3: Effect of connectivity between employed (pUE = 0.01)
pEE = 0.02 pEE = 0.08
Intercept 0.122285 (0.001220) 0.126806 (0.001214)
Slope (∗10−4) -4.70 (1.01) -7.52 (0.98)
C. Effect of pUU
How does, now, pUU affect duration dependence? Table 4 reports how our regression coefficients
vary with that parameter (see also Figure 4). Clearly, an increase in the connectivity between the
unemployed reduces duration dependence. This is because that parameter has a positive, indirect
effect, on a long-term unemployed’s number of ties with the employed. During any time interval,
a fraction of my unemployed friends will find jobs, and these connections are valuable for me in
order to find jobs. Being better connected with other unemployed workers therefore increases my
exit rate. In contrast, the effect is much weaker for the short-term unemployed, since the stock of
ties between an unemployed worker and other unemployed workers gradually builds up during the
unemployment spell. Again, pUU affects the short-term unemployed’s connections with employed
people only through a very weak echo effect from their previous unemployment spell. Figure 4bis
shows the effect of pUU on the number of ties.
Table 4: Effect of connectivity between unemployed
pUU = 0.02 pUU = 0.08
Intercept 0.130023 (0.001167) 0.126284 (0.001239)
Slope (∗10−4) -10.62 (0.86) -5.82 (1.03)
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D. Effect of total tie turnover
Finally, we look at a proportional increase in all parameters related to social links. This represents
a situation where, keeping the job turnover constant, social links evolve relatively more rapidly.
Results are reported in Table 5 and Figure 5. We see an increase in duration dependence. This
effect is confirmed by looking at the number of connections with employed in Figure 5bis. A
proportional increase in all link parameters leads to a strong decrease in the number of links with
employed of the long-term unemployed, but leaves the connections of the short-term unemployed
almost unaffected.
These results are due to the interactions between social and labor market transitions. For
an unemployed worker, there are two sources of establishing a bond with an employed worker:
creating a new bond with an employed person (which happens with probability pUE), and having
an unemployed fellow finding a job (which happens with probability h). Similarly, there are two
sources of destruction of bonds with the employed: the bond destruction process (λ) and the job
destruction process (d). Therefore, a proportional increase in λ and pUE does not affect the bond
creation and bond destruction rates proportionally. Because pUE is small, an increase in pUE has
a smaller proportional effect on the rate at which bonds with the employed are created than the
effect of the associated, proportional increase in λ on the total rate of destruction of such bonds.
Consequently, the total number of ties of the long-term unemployed with employed workers falls,
which explains the rise in duration dependence.
Table 5: Effect of total tie turnover
benchmark benchmark ∗ 5 benchmark ∗ 10
Intercept 0.130023 (0.001167) 0.145337 (0.001049) 0.153961 (0.001032)
Slope (∗10−4) -10.62 (0.86) -17.31 (0.43) -17.95 (0.31)
Two other interesting features appear in Figure 5. First, the longest unemployement spells last
longer when the tie turnover is higher. For the same average probabilities of job creation and job
destruction, more people suffer from very long durations of unemployment. This arises because
they have less links with employed workers: When the tie turnover is higher, the probability to
find a job of a long-term unemployed is lower. Second, we see that unemployed lose much of their
connections to the workplace in the beginning of their unemployment spells. The situation then
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reaches a positive limit after which the number of connections with employed is stable and does
not decrease further. This properties are confirmed by approximate computations derived in the
Appendix.
E. Effect of job creation h
Turning now to h, the gross flow of job creation, we see that it increases duration dependence,
as measured by both regression results (Table 6) and the evolution of the average probability to
find a job (Figure 6). Notice that changing h strongly affects the initial probability to find a job,
hence the intercept of the estimation. In order to compare the magnitude of duration dependence
across different values of h, we thus divide the probability to find a job by the initial probability
(in Figure 6) and the slope of the estimation by the intercept (in the Table 6). This gives us
relative measures of duration dependence.
An increase in h increases the total number of employed workers, and thus the opportunities
to establish ties with them. Consequently, all workers will have more ties with the employed.
However, that effect is stronger for the employed, and thus for the short-term unemployed, than
for the long-term unemployed, because pEE > pUE . Consequently, the number of ties with the
employed increases relatively more for the short-term than for the long-term unemployed, which
accentuates duration dependence.
That is mitigated by another effect: when h is larger, establishing ties with unemployed
workers is more valuable, because these workers will become employed more quickly. This tends
to reduce the rate at which the number of ties with employed workers fall during an unemployment
spell, thus dampening duration dependence. However, that effect is not strong enough to overcome
the preceding one.
Finally, unemployement spells are longer when h is lower. Since the average probability to
find a job becomes relatively flat when unemployment duration is high, this tends to lower the
estimated slopes in algebraic values, thus decreasing estimated duration dependence.
Table 6. Effect of the probability of job creation
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h = 0.04 h = 0.12 h = 0.24
Intercept 0.044889 (0.000460) 0.130023 (0.001167) 0.249241 (0.002241)
Slope (∗10−4) -1.60 (0.11) -10.62 (0.86) -25.14 (3.76)
Slope / intercept (∗10−4) 35.6 81.7 100.9
F. Effect of job destruction d
Table 7 and Figure 7 report the effect of the job destruction rate d. Given h, a greater d has
either little effect on duration dependence (from d = 0.01 to d = 0.02), or reduces its magnitude
(from d = 0.02 to d = 0.06).
The effects are basically the opposite of those of h. An increase in d reduces the total number
of opportunities to have a link with employed workers, since it reduces employment. But the effect
is proportionally larger for the employed (and thus the short-term unemployed) than for the long-
term unemployed, because pEE is larger than pUE. There is also another effect: a higher d makes
connections with the employed less valuable (because they are more short-lived), which tends to
compress the gap between the stock of employed workers known by a short-term unemployed and
that known by a long-term unemployed. This also tends to reduce duration dependence.
Table 7. Effect of the probability of job destruction.
d = 0.01 d = 0.02 d = 0.06
Intercept 0.128658 (0.001521) 0.130023 (0.001167) 0.126191 0.000799
Slope (∗10−4) -9.41 (1.04) -10.62 (0.86) -7.47 (0.64)
G. Effect of total labor turnover
It is also interesting to study the impact of an employment neutral increase of h and d, i.e. a
proportional increase in h and d. Table 8 and Figure 8 report the results5. We see that the
relative average probability to find a job is virtually not affected by the turnover although the
estimated measure of duration dependence goes up. The main reason for this difference is that
unemployment spells are shorter when labor turnover is higher. Since the average probability to
5Here, the number of ties with the employed and its evolution as a function of unemployment duration are also
not affected by the turnover (Figure 8bis).
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find a job is convex and relatively flat when unemployment duration is high, estimated slopes
will be higher (in absolute value) when labor turnover is higher. In other words, if duration
dependence is measured by the slope/intercept ratio, greater labor market turnover increases it
only because it affects the underlying distribution of durations and because the true relationship
between duration and exit probabilities is nonlinear.
Table 8. Effect of total labor turnover.
benchmark ∗ 0.5 benchmark benchmark ∗ 2
Intercept 0.066950 (0.000830) 0.130023 (0.001167) 0.251049 (0.001675)
Slope (∗10−4) -3.60 (0.27) -10.62 (0.86) -24.75 (2.86)
Slope / intercept (∗10−4) -53.8 -81.7 -98.6
Neutrality of exit rates with respect to an equiporportional increase in h and d is essentially
due to the fact that transition rates in the labor market are large relative to transition rates
in the formation and dissolution of social ties (as suggested by the approximation to the model
developed in the Appendix). Intuitively, in such a situation, the labor market status of a particular
connection at date t is irrelevant, because my friends will move often between employment and
unemployment (relative to the characteristic time of bond formation and dissolution). During an
unemployment spell, the evolution of the number of ties with employed workers is then largely
driven by the process of tie destruction (λ) and tie formation (pUE), so that we do not find a
noticeable effect of labor turnover. In other words, the positive effects of h on duration dependence
and the the negative effects of d roughly cancel each other.
V. Duration dependence in employment spells
Our model contributes to explain the well-documented phenomenon of negative dependence of exit
rates on the duration of unemployment spells. However, it has another, more novel implication,
which is that exit rates should also positively depend on the duration of the last job. As long
as pEE > pUE, the unemployed workers who have been employed for a longer time also have
relatively more links with employed workers, and we therefore expect their exit rate to be larger.
This is confirmed by our regressions in Table 9 estimated for benchmark parameter values and
by looking directly at probabilities (Figure 9).
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Table 9. Duration dependence in employment spells
Intercept 0.126378 (0.001490)
Duration unemployed (∗10−4) -9.58 (0.90)
Duration of last job (∗10−4) 0.75 (0.18)
VI. Social organization
In the previous sections, we studied how social ties affect the labor market dynamics. Our model
can also be used in a complementary way to understand how society organizes itself along labor
status lines. Especially, given that new bonds form preferentially among people with the same
labor status, we would expect some form of social separation to emerge between unemployed and
employed. To look at this issue, we simply consider for each individual i and at each time t the
proportion of neighbors of i who are unemployed at t. We then aggregate these proportions across
all unemployed individuals and across all employed individuals. The comparison of both quantities
tells us whether, in fact, unemployed end up preferentially connected with other unemployed.
Table 10 reports these values and (their standard deviations in parenthesis) for a typical simulation
run at different values of labor and tie turnover. Recall that the average proportion of unemployed
in the population is d/(d+ h) ' 0.143.
Table 10. Social separation between employed and unemployed
(d = 0.01; h = 0.06)
% of unemployed neighbors tie turnover ∗ 1 tie turnover ∗ 5
Among unemployed 0.1509600 (0.0561541) 0.2889542 (0.1830154)
Among employed 0.1228365 (0.0441347) 0.0764979 (0.0433909)
labor turnover ∗ 5
% of unemployed neighbors tie turnover ∗ 1 tie turnover ∗ 5
Among unemployed 0.1419010 (0.0457575) 0.1455494 (0.0518359)
Among employed 0.1387108 (0.0448782) 0.1290424 (0.0445838)
We thus find that the extent of social separation is usually quite low. The exception is when
the labor turnover is low and the tie turnover is high, in which case a strong social separation
emerges. Also, actual preferential attachement with others of the same status tends to increase
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when the tie turnover increases and when the labor turnover decreases. We explain these features
below.
That greater turnover of social ties increases social segregation between the employed and
the unemployed may come as a surprise. It is another aspect of tie dynamics being driven by
both social and labor market transitions. As already explained above, there are two sources
of tie formation with employed workers for unemployed ones: establishing a new bond with an
employed person (pUE) and having an unemployed friend finding a job (h). Because pUE is
small, the first mechanism is a small component of that process, so that an increase in pUE by
a given factor will only have a small impact on the unemployed’s ties with employed people. By
contrast, an increase in pUU by the same factor will have a larger impact on the unemployed’s ties
with other unemployed workers. Consequently, greater social turnover increases the proportion of
unemployed people among an unemployed’s connection. The reverse effects hold for the employed:
because pUE is small, job destruction (d) is the dominant source that generates ties between them
and unemployed workers. The increase in pUE has thus only a small impact on their links with
unemployed workers, while the proportional increase in pEE has a larger impact on their links
with other employed workers. Therefore, the share of employed workers in their connections goes
up.6
Conversely, an increase in labor turnover tends to reduce social segregation, because it tends
to offset the bias due to the lower rate of bonding between employed and unemployed workers.
When labor turnover is high, my unemployed friends quickly find jobs, and my employed friends
lose their jobs often. Consequently, the fact that links are more frequent between two employed
or two unemployed persons rather than between an employed and an unemployed, is of little
consequences: labor turnover brings the proportion of employed workers among one’s links more
in line between the employed and the unemployed. This analysis highlights the important mixing
role of labor markets.
6Also, note that if the dynamics of ties were totally independent of labor market transitions, an equiproportionate
increase in pUU , pEE , λ, and pUE would have no impact of our measure of social segregation.
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VII. Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we studied a simple model where labor status and social ties coevolve through
time. On the one hand, social ties are helpful to find a job. Connections with employed increase
the unemployed’s likelihood to find a job. On the other hand, labor status affects the evolution
of ties. Especially, the probability of formation of a new tie is greater among two individuals
who have the same job status than among individuals with different job status. We showed that
this simple assumption generates negative duration dependence of exit rates from unemployment.
Long-term unemployed have less connections with employed, hence a lower probability to find a
job, than short-term unemployed. We provided a number of stylized facts regarding the effect of
the parameters on the shape and magnitude of duration dependence.
Our model potentially has a number of testable empirical predictions that future research
could test. A first range of predictions are about the link between labor market history and exit
probabilities: these include the widely documented phenomenon of duration dependence, but also
the positive influence of the total duration of the previous job on exit rates. However, these pre-
dictions are shared with any model where workers accumulate human capital during employment
periods and gradually lose it during unemployment spells. A second range of predictions, more
specific to our model, is about the coevolution of labor market status and social ties; to test them
empirically, one possibility would be to compare communities with different intensities of social
interactions (these differences could for example be driven by cultural customs, if one considers
different ethnic groups, or by differences in urban structures, if one considers different cities),
and correlate these differences with the labor market outcomes of these communities. Another
approach would be to use individual data on both employment status and social ties, and examine
the correlation between unemployment duration, job duration, and so on and the number of ties
with employed and unemployed workers.
The model could also be enriched by introducing additional margins of economic behavior.
That could include wage bargaining, price formation, a time constraint to be allocated between
work, search, and socialization, and competing search methods. As stated above, we are reason-
ably confident that our results would be robust as long as the model exhibits economic inbreeding.
However, these extensions could potentially yield many interesting insights.
15
Appendix.
A simple heuristic approximation to the model
The following approximation allows to compute the evolution of the number of links between
an unemployed and employed and unemployed workers over time. Let us denote by t = 0 the date
at which the worker become unemployed, let et his mass of ties with employed workers, let ut his
mass of ties with unemployed workers, let E = h/(h+ d) the steady state level of unemployment
and U = d/(h+ d) the steady state level of employment. Then the evolution of e and u follows
approximately:
e˙ = −de+ hu+ pUE(E − e)− λe
u˙ = −hu+ de+ pUU (U − u)− λu
The long-term solution to that system is
e∞ = h
pUE(λ+ pUU + h) + pUUd
(h+ d)[d(pUU + λ) + h(pUE + λ) + (pUU + λ)(pUE + λ)]
u∞ = d
pUEh+ pUU (λ+ d+ pUE)
(h+ d)[d(pUU + λ) + h(pUE + λ) + (pUU + λ)(pUE + λ)]
The evolution matrix
 −(d+ λ+ pUE) h
d −(h+ λ+ pUU )
 has two negative eigenvalues.
When pUE and pUU are small compared to d and h, the evolution matrix is approximately
equal to
 −(d+ λ) h
d −(h+ λ)
. In this case, the eigenvalues are −(h + d + λ) and −λ. The
corresponding eigenvectors are
 1
−1
 and
 1
d/h
 . The solution to the dynamic system is
 et
ut
 = c0e−(h+d+λ)t
 1
−1
+ c1e−λt
 1
d/h
+
 e∞
u∞
 .
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One must have c1 =
e0+u0−(e∞+u∞)
1+d/h and c0 =
(e0−e∞)d/h−(u0−u∞)
1+d/h , so that
et =
(e0 − e∞)d/h− (u0 − u∞)
1 + d/h
e−(h+d+λ)t +
e0 + u0 − (e∞ + u∞)
1 + d/h
e−λt + e∞. (VII.1)
It is interesting to see what happens when h and d become large relative to other transition
rates, holding h/d = η contant, i.e. when the temperature of the labor market is large relative to
the temperature of social networks. We then have:
lim e∞ =
η
(1 + η)2
(ηpUE + pUU ),
limu∞ =
ηpUE + pUU
(1 + η)2
which does not depend on labor market temperature. In (VII.1), the first term is negligible, so
that
et ≈ η
1 + η
(e0 + u0 − ηpUE + pUU
1 + η
)e−λt +
η
(1 + η)2
(ηpUE + pUU ).
Clearly, the overall temperature of the labor market does not affect the evolution of links with
the employed.
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